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In this paper, we set out to develop a theoretical and conceptual framework for the
new field of Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience. This framework should be able
to integrate insights from several relevant disciplines: theory on embodied cognition,
ecological psychology, phenomenology, dynamical systems theory, and neurodynamics.
We suggest that the main task of Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience is to
investigate the phenomenon of skilled intentionality from the perspective of the
self-organization of the brain-body-environment system, while doing justice to the
phenomenology of skilled action. In previous work, we have characterized skilled
intentionality as the organism’s tendency toward an optimal grip on multiple relevant
affordances simultaneously. Affordances are possibilities for action provided by the
environment. In the first part of this paper, we introduce the notion of skilled intentionality
and the phenomenon of responsiveness to a field of relevant affordances. Second, we
use Friston’s work on neurodynamics, but embed a very minimal version of his Free
Energy Principle in the ecological niche of the animal. Thus amended, this principle is
helpful for understanding the embeddedness of neurodynamics within the dynamics
of the system “brain-body-landscape of affordances.” Next, we show how we can use
this adjusted principle to understand the neurodynamics of selective openness to the
environment: interacting action-readiness patterns at multiple timescales contribute to
the organism’s selective openness to relevant affordances. In the final part of the paper,
we emphasize the important role of metastable dynamics in both the brain and the
brain-body-environment system for adequate affordance-responsiveness. We exemplify
our integrative approach by presenting research on the impact of Deep Brain Stimulation
on affordance responsiveness of OCD patients.
Keywords: affordances, self-organization, metastability, optimal grip, Merleau-Ponty, neurodynamics, Free Energy
Principle, landscape of affordances
INTRODUCTION
This Frontiers special issue on Radical Embodied Cognitive
Neuroscience invites researchers to re-imagine cognitive neuro-
science in terms of (radical) embodied cognitive science. Radical
Embodiment is the view that cognition ought to be under-
stood primarily in terms of the embodied agent—environment
dynamics. Neural dynamics can only be studied while tak-
ing into account the larger brain-body-environment dynamics
(Chemero, 2009). Besides highlighting the dynamical aspects of
cognition, embodied cognitive science has also highlighted the
importance of phenomenology and ecological psychology for
studying cognition. In this paper, we develop a theoretical and
conceptual framework that aims to integrate some of the var-
ious fields of study that come together in a Radical Embodied
Cognitive Neuroscience: neurodynamics, ecological psychology,
phenomenology, self-organization and dynamical systems theory.
The starting point of this paper is the question how skilled
agents interact with their environment and can tend toward
improvement of their situation. In particular, we are interested in
how, in a particular context, skilled agents are selectively respon-
sive to only some of the many available “affordances” or possi-
bilities for action offered by their environment (Gibson, 1979;
Chemero, 2003). In order to understand this, phenomenology
suggests that we need to complement Gibson’s original theory of
affordances with an understanding of the attracting or soliciting
character of affordances in relation to an agent in a particular sit-
uation (Rietveld, 2008a; Withagen et al., 2012). We think that the
main task ofRadical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience is to explain
how the changing world and the dynamics of the agent’s state
mesh together in a way that makes adequate action possible, while
simultaneously doing justice to the phenomenology of skilled
action. In this paper we theoretically and conceptually develop
a framework for investigating this. Although the phenomenon
of skilled activity is relevant for both humans and non-human
animals (Ingold, 2000), we will focus on human beings in this
paper. Also, we will limit ourselves to agents who have already
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acquired their skills. So we will not focus on developing, learning,
fine-tuning, and modifying skills nor on the evolutionary history
of skilled behaviors, although these topics raise important open
issues as well.
In the first part of this paper, we focus on the phenomenon
of selective affordance-responsiveness because that is an ecologi-
cally valid way to characterize the dynamics of the system “skilled
agent—environment.” In the second part of the paper, we show
how theoretical neuroscience can help to understand selective
affordance-responsiveness. First, we introduce the framework of
self-organization in order to bring the necessary conceptual tools
to the table. Second, we focus on how neurodynamics is embed-
ded in the dynamics of the broader brain-body-environment
system. We present the Free Energy Principle (FEP) as a promis-
ing framework to understand this embeddedness but, inspired by
Anderson and Chemero (2013), interpret it in a more minimal
way than has previously been done. Furthermore, we show how
we can use this adjusted framework to understand the neurody-
namics of selective openness to affordances. Next, we argue for
a situated understanding of the FEP in which the self-organizing
brain is understood as coordinating action-readiness patterns to
deal with relevant affordances. In the final part of the paper, we
illustrate the plausibility of our conceptual framework by showing
how it is able to integrate findings on metastable dynamics in the
brain-body-environment system, and how it is able to shine new
light on the effects of Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) on treatment
resistant obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).
SKILLED INTENTIONALITY AND OPTIMAL GRIP ON A FIELD
OF AFFORDANCES
Affordance-responsiveness is a central feature of everyday skill-
ful activity of both humans and non-human animals (Rietveld,
2012a). Affordances are possibilities for action provided to an ani-
mal by the substances, surfaces, objects, and other living creatures
that surround it (Gibson, 1979; Reed, 1996; Heft, 2001; Chemero,
2003, 2009; Silva et al., 2013). Affordances can be defined as rela-
tions between aspects of the material environment and abilities
available in a form of life (Rietveld and Kiverstein, under review;
cf. Chemero, 2003).
Up till now in the field of Embodied Embedded Cognition
affordances have typically been understood as motor possibilities
the environment offers to a creature, such as reaching, grasp-
ing, sitting, walking etc. Developing a Wittgensteinian account
of affordances, we (Rietveld and Kiverstein, under review) have
argued that for creatures that inhabit a resourceful social and
cultural environment as we do, the possibilities for action the
environment offers are far richer: the affordances on offer in the
landscape of affordances available in our form of life are related
to the whole spectrum of abilities available in our human socio-
cultural practices (cf. Heft, 2001). Both unreflective action in
everyday life and episodes of what are traditionally called “higher”
cognition are forms of skilled interaction with the environment
and can be understood in terms of responsiveness to affordances
(Rietveld, 2008c, 2013).
Based on a careful reading of Gibson, we have recently shown
(Rietveld and Kiverstein, under review), that contrary to what
many think, it is not affordances but the ecological niche for a kind
of animal with a particular way of life that forms the cornerstone
of Gibson’s ideas. Our notion of the landscape of available affor-
dances was introduced to do justice to this primacy of the niche,
which is present independently of perception by a particular indi-
vidual (See Box 1). The astonishing richness of the landscape of
available affordance in our niche hinges on the fact that both
relata of affordances, both the sociomaterial environment and the
reservoir of abilities in our socio-cultural practices, manifest an
enormous variety.
This enormous richness raises the question how an organism
can be responsive to only the relevant affordances in a given situ-
ation. Phenomenologically, some of the affordances around us do
not leave us cold butmove us. In earlier work (Rietveld, 2008a) we
have suggested that an affordance can “invite” or “solicit” behav-
ior dependent on the current concerns of the organism and the
situation it is in (Withagen et al., 2012). The metaphor of a field is
useful here: some affordances stand out more than others. Some
are experienced as soliciting immediately, others are experienced
as soliciting on the horizon and still others are completely ignored
(only the latter do in fact leave us cold). We can distinguish
between an affordance, i.e., a possibility for action available in our
form of life at a certain location, and a solicitation. A solicitation
is an affordance that stands out as relevant in a specific situation
lived by an animal. “Action readiness” (Frijda, 1986, 2007) is a
useful notion here, because it is a phenomenon in between overt
action and ability. A solicitation is the (pre-reflective) experien-
tial equivalent of a bodily action readiness: the readiness of the
affordance-related ability (Rietveld, 2008a).
Much of our everyday interactions with the environment, such
as riding a bike through a city, moving toward an appropriate
distance from other people in an elevator, or ordering a cup of
Box 1 | Terminology of skilled intentionality.
AFFORDANCE: A possibility for action provided by the environment to an animal.
SOLICITATION: An affordance that stands out as relevant for a particular animal in a specific situation.
SKILLED INTENTIONALITY: The kind of intentionality an individual exhibits when acting skillfully in a familiar situation (see Text for
elaboration). We characterize skilled intentionality as the tendency toward an optimal grip on a field of affordances.
TENDENCY TOWARD AN OPTIMAL GRIP: The tendency of a skilled individual to be moved to improve its grip on the situation by
responding to solicitations.
LANDSCAPE OF AFFORDANCES: The affordances available in an ecological niche. In our human form of life, these are related to the
whole spectrum of abilities available in our socio-cultural practices.
FIELD OF AFFORDANCES: The affordances that stand out as relevant for a particular individual in a particular situation; i.e., the multiplicity
of affordances that solicit the individual.
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coffee in a bar, can be described as skillful activities. In previous
work, we have introduced the notion of skilled intentionality as
the tendency toward an optimal grip on a situation by being selec-
tively responsive to available affordances (Rietveld, 2008c, 2012a,
2013). The tendency toward an optimal grip1 is a primarily phe-
nomenological notion that signifies the way a skilled individual
acts in a familiar environment in order to improve its grip on
the situation. What is central to this notion, is that the individual
experiences the situation in terms of a deviation of an optimum.
As Merleau-Ponty puts it:
For each object, as for each picture in an art gallery, there is an
optimum distance from which it requires to be seen, a direc-
tion viewed from which it vouchsafes most of itself: at a shorter
or greater distance we have merely a perception blurred through
excess or deficiency. We therefore tend toward the maximum of
visibility, and seek a better focus as with a microscope (Merleau-
Ponty, 2002/1945, p. 352).
Importantly, during those episodes of skilled activity, the skilled
individual does not have an explicit goal in mind, but rather is
solicited by the environment in such a way as to improve her grip
on the situation. Phenomenologically, this deviation of an opti-
mum can be described as an experienced tension to be reduced.
In the case of a skilled individual, which is what we focus on in
this paper, tending toward grip is the equivalent of having an
action readiness for dealing adequately with an affordance; one
is responsive to, or poised to act adequately on an affordance.
We suggest that the tendency toward an optimal grip on the
situation is a basic concern of living organisms and is a central
feature of our everyday skillful dealings with our environment. It
shapes the person’s selective openness to the landscape of available
affordances so that certain affordances “stand out” as relevant and
the individual can unreflectively improve his or her situation by
simply being responsive to this structured field of relevant affor-
dances (Rietveld, 2008c, 2012a,b). For instance, when entering a
crowded elevator, we stand at an appropriate distance from the
other people.
It is this phenomenon of the tendency toward an optimal grip
and especially how theories from the fields of self-organization
and theoretical neuroscience can contribute to an understanding
of context-sensitive selective openness to relevant affordances that
is the central topic of this paper.
The specific structure of the field of affordances of a particular
individual is dependent on the current concerns and abilities of
that organism and the current situation. The structure of the field
of affordances changes when either the landscape of affordances
changes (i.e., when the sociomaterial environment changes or
when the abilities available in a form of life change), or when the
1The word grip has several connotations in the English language. It can refer
to a physical grip (such as when grasping a cup), but also a more intellec-
tual grip (such as when having a grip on a problem), as well as a grip in the
sense of being able to deal with something (such as when losing your grip on
a situation). As we state in the text, skilled action pertains to simple motor
behaviors, but also to more complex and context-sensitive actions. Optimal
grip is, because of the multiple connotations of the word grip, supposed to
characterize all these aspects of the phenomenology of skilled action.
concerns of the individual change. If a rabbit eats the only carrot
available in a certain place, it changes the layout of the (locally
present) landscape of affordances. However, as the landscape of
affordances changes and the individual’s interest in eating dimin-
ishes, new possibilities for action show up. Once the carrot has
been eaten, the rabbit hole might solicit sleeping, or a place a bit
further away might solicit exploring (cf. Dreyfus, 2007).
Changes in the field of affordances can also originate in the
environment. For the eating rabbit, a sound in the bushes might
change the field in such a way that the carrot does not solicit
eating anymore, but now the rabbit hole solicits hiding. An
important part of skilled intentionality is therefore not only being
skillfully responsive to one affordance, but also being open to
changes in the context and adequately engaging with these affor-
dances (see also Section Toward a Radical Embodied Cognitive
Neuroscience on metastability). The tendency toward an optimal
grip on a field of affordances is the result of a dynamic inter-
play between the landscape of affordances and the current state
of the organism. On the side of the organism, states of action
readiness interact in order to bring about selective openness to
a landscape of affordances (see Figure 1). We will return to the
processes of self-organization and neurodynamics contributing to
selective openness in the subsequent sections of the paper. One
aspect of the answer to the question of how individuals can get a
grip on the multiplicity of affordances available already becomes
clear from looking at the structure of the landscape of affordances.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE LANDSCAPE OF AFFORDANCES
The concept of a “landscape of affordances” aims to capture the
interrelatedness of the available affordances. Affordances are not
encountered as a set of separate possibilities for action, but rather
as a nested structure of interrelated affordances2. In the case of the
form of life of enculturated human beings, this structure can be
very complex. It is only against the background of socio-cultural
practices, places and institutions that the affordances here in my
office are intelligible. The affordances of places (libraries, restau-
rants, etc.) typically constrain behavior over a longer timescale,
while the affordances of objects nested in such a place, say the
door to the library’s reading room, typically constrain behavior
on a shorter timescale3. Such place-affordances (the affordances
of say, university libraries, railway stations, supermarkets, swim-
ming pools or restaurants) are the contexts in which many of our
activities unfold (Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2012; cf. Heft, 2001).
Which affordances are relevant depends on the “behavior setting”
(Barker, 1968; Heft, 2001): the possibility of calling a waiter is rel-
evant in a restaurant but not when we are in a supermarket. Being
2This is a remark that concerns the structure of the ecological niche and not
our phenomenology. Phenomenologically, the structure of our experience of
solicitations resembles more that of a field with some solicitations standing
out andwith a horizon.Moreover, this is not to deny the fact that our lives pro-
ceed along paths or trails, as Ingold (2011, p. 147) rightfully stresses, “always
on the way from one place to another.”
3We do not wish to claim that the landscape has a clear hierarchical structure.
Rather, the structure would be more like a heterarchy. That is to say, there
is no strict demarcation of levels within the nested structure, although when
focusing on a specific event, such as dining in a restaurant, place-affordances
can be discerned.
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FIGURE 1 | Sketch of the conceptual framework to be refined. Through skilled intentionality one gets a grip on a field of affordances (Rietveld, 2013)
(inspired by Chemero, 2003, 2009; Dreyfus, 2007; Thompson, 2007, 2011; Tschacher and Haken, 2007; Rietveld, 2008a,b, 2012a,b).
in a restaurant constrains or pre-structures which affordances are
relevant to me. In order to be responsive to the appropriate affor-
dances of a situation (e.g., calling out a waiter in a restaurant), one
needs to be well attuned to the current context (one needs to have
the ability to deal and be ready to deal with restaurants and wait-
ers). In sum, we suggest that responsiveness to a place-affordance,
which is a nest of affordances, generates an action readiness that
makes the individual selectively open to the landscape of affor-
dances. As such this responsiveness pre-structures the relevance
of locally available affordances in a way that allows the individual
to have a grip on the rich landscape of affordances in which she is
situated.
The nestedness of the landscape of affordances thus helps the
organism to gain a grip on multiple relevant affordances simul-
taneously. The challenge for the organism is to, in a particular
situation, be selectively open to only the relevant affordances. In
the remainder of this paper we seek to find out how theoretical
neuroscience and dynamical cognitive neuroscience contribute to
understanding such self-organized relevance sensitivity.
SELF-ORGANIZATION
One of the developments relevant for an understanding
of the mechanisms that contribute to selective affordance-
responsiveness is an improved understanding of self-organizing
systems. Especially, we are interested in self-organizing systems
that are able to actively influence their interactions with the envi-
ronment in order to adapt to and induce environmental changes,
i.e., so called homeokinetic or self-serving systems (Iberall, 1977;
Turvey and Carello, 2012). The theory of self-organization is par-
ticularly suitable for the framework of affordance-responsiveness
developed here, because in both of these theoretical frameworks,
it is the reduction of a tension or gradient that is the cen-
tral motivation for an action: it is the environment that is the
driving force for an action for an organism in a particular sit-
uation. We will first present the familiar Bénard effect as an
example of how self-organizing patterns can be functional with
respect to their environment and subsequently describe how the
theory of self-organization can improve our understanding of
affordance-responsiveness.
Self-organizing systems are initially disordered systems where
global order can arise under the influence of the system’s own
dynamics. This is typically the case when a control parameter
reaches a critical value upon which new forms of organization
become possible for the system. Within the self-organizing range,
the behavior of the system is low dimensional, i.e., it can be quan-
tified by a small amount of order parameters that describe the
macroscopic patterns in the system (See Box 2). Classical exam-
ples from the literature stem from diverse fields such as treatments
of the Bénard cell in non-equilibrium fluid dynamics (Bénard,
1900; Bishop, 2008), the laser in optics (Haken, 2004) and coor-
dination dynamics in cognitive science (Haken et al., 1985).
RAYLEIGH–BÉNARD CONVECTION
The Rayleigh–Bénard effect is empirically, theoretically and philo-
sophically the most well studied non-linear self-organizing sys-
tem. The phenomenon occurs when a layer of fluid is heated
from below. Cold water is denser (hence heavier) than warm
water, so the temperature difference creates a buoyancy force.
When the temperature difference is small, the viscosity of the
fluid counteracts the buoyancy force and the system will dissipate
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Box 2 | Terminology of complex and dynamical systems4.
STATE SPACE: The space defined by the set of all possible states a system could ever be in.
TRAJECTORY (PATH): A set of positions in the state space through which the system might pass successively. The behavior of the
system is often described by trajectories through the state space.
ATTRACTOR: A point of state space to which the system will tend when in the surrounding region.
TOPOLOGY (ATTRACTOR LANDSCAPE): The layout of attractors in the state space.
CONTROL PARAMETER: Some parameter of a system whose continuous quantitative change leads to a non-continuous, qualitative
change in the attractor landscape.
ORDER PARAMETER: Some parameter of a system that summarizes the behavior of the system’s components.
CIRCULAR CAUSALITY: The mutually constraining relationship between the microscopic and macroscopic elements of a complex sys-
tem: the order parameters emerge out of the microscopic dynamics, while the order parameters themselves constrain or enslave the
microscopic dynamics.
SECOND CIRCULARITY: The mutually constraining relationship between one or more control parameters in the environment and a
self-organizing system. The system self-organizes in order to reduce the control parameter(s) that gives(s) rise to its self-organization.
(CENTRAL) PATTERN GENERATOR: A dynamical system producing rhythmic patterned activity potentially modulated by feedback
mechanisms.
METASTABILITY: A property of coupled dynamical systems in which over time the system’s tendency to integrate and segregate coexist.
energy through heat conduction. When the temperature gradient
passes a critical value, the buoyancy force overcomes the viscosity
(more potential energy is brought in the system than can be dissi-
pated through heat conduction) and the system becomes globally
unstable. This leads to convection patterns in the shape of parallel
cylinders (so called convection or Bénard rolls).
In the formalization of the Bénard effect, the temperature
difference between the top and the bottom of the fluid is
considered a control parameter. The macroscopic state of the
system (conduction or convection) is a function of the con-
trol parameter. Furthermore, in the self-organizing regime, the
system can be described and determined by only a few vari-
ables, the so-called order parameters. The relation between the
order parameters and the microscopic components (the single
molecules of the liquid, e.g., water molecules) is a peculiar one:
the order parameters constrain the trajectories of the parts, but
the parts also generate the order parameters. The relationship
between parts (the microscopic) and whole (the macroscopic)
is one of mutual constraints or, to use Tschacher and Haken’s
philosophically somewhat problematic term, circular causality
(Tschacher and Haken, 2007).
GRADIENT REDUCTION AND SECOND CIRCULARITY
How can the theory of self-organization help us to understand
the mechanisms of the tendency toward an optimal grip in
human beings? There is a second fact about self-organization
in the Bénard system. The self-organization has an impact on
the environment as well. The self-organization reduces the very
temperature gradient that gives rise to it: it is the temperature
difference that enables the convection, but the convection reduces
the temperature difference. It is due to this so called second circu-
larity, that self-organized patterns are functional with respect to
their environment, that is to say: the patterns are geared toward the
reduction of the environmental gradients5 on the system. Crucially,
the function of self-organized pattern formation, according to
4These are all standard definitions, in this case obtained from Chemero
(2009), Kelso (2012), Rabinovich et al. (2008), Tschacher (2010).
5The notion of gradient has a clear physical interpretation in the case of the
Bénard effect: it is the difference in temperature between the top and the
Tschacher and Haken (2007), is to adapt to environmental con-
straints and realize dissipation of the gradients.
It is these two circularities that we find in affordance respon-
siveness as well. On the one hand, solicitationsmove the organism
in a particular direction; on the other hand leads the respon-
siveness to the solicitation to a reorganization of the field of
affordances, which makes new solicitations stand out. We there-
fore propose to think of relevant6 affordances as gradients that
drive the dynamics of the system and in return are consumed by it.
There is, however, an important difference between a Bénard
system and a system like the brain-body-environment system:
in the Bénard effect and most other standard examples of self-
organization, there is only one control parameter working on the
system. For our purpose of understanding the mechanisms of
optimal grip in the case of human beings, it is important to con-
sider the case of multiple control parameters, because generally
there are multiple relevant affordances in any particular situation
of an individual7.
SELF-ORGANIZATION AND LIVING SYSTEMS
There is another significant dissimilarity between systems like the
Bénard system and systems like the affordance-responsive organ-
ism. In the case of non-living systems, as in the Bénard system, the
self-organizing pattern disappears if the external control param-
eter decreases below a threshold. For example, if the temperature
difference reaches below the critical value, the organized patterns
disappear. Living systems have to be able to actively interact with
bottom of the layer of fluid. In the case of the coordination dynamics of loco-
motion, the gradient is for instance the speed of the treadmill to which the
animal adapts its gait. Tschacher and Haken (2007) give an example of a psy-
chological gradient guiding an action: in the context of a letter that one has to
mail, the letter-affording-delivery stands out as a gradient to be reduced.
6Tschacher and Haken (2007) do not make the distinction between solicita-
tions and affordances. Their use of the word “affordances” applies to gradients
that actually drive the system (i.e., what we call solicitations).
7An important open question is that of optimality: on some interpretations of
self-organization (Schneider and Kay, 1994), the pattern that arises is always
the one that most efficiently (i.e., in the least amount of time) dissipates the
gradient. As Haken and Tschacher (2010) point out, it is not clear that such an
optimality principle for self-organizing systems in general is feasible.
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the gradients that affect their self-organization. One could then
say that the gradient is not given by, but obtained from the envi-
ronment (Iberall, 1977; Turvey and Carello, 2012). In the first
case, systems are served by the environment, while in the sec-
ond case, systems are self-serving or homeokinetic8. These latter
systems can internally generate forces to counteract the effect of
physical gradients on the system, andmove through their material
environment to avoid harmful gradients and find new ones [this is
what Turvey and Carello (2012, p.11) call “proto-foraging” behav-
ior]. Crucially, through this capacity, the system is able to (within
limits) influence the gradients that affect it and hence maintain
its own self-organization (Kugler and Turvey, 1988; Turvey and
Carello, 2012). In the hypothetical case of a living Bénard cell, this
would amount to a layer of fluid being able to heat or cool itself,
or to move through a temperature landscape in the environment
in order to regulate its self-organizing patterns.
What is interesting about Tschacher and Haken’s (2007) pro-
posal is the conceptual link between gradients and affordances.
They do emphasize that the reduction of gradients can also
occur when more gradients work on a system, but in their
(2007) account, the nature of these gradients and their struc-
ture remains undeveloped. The perspective we have sketched
advances Tschacher and Haken’s account of affordances in three
ways. First, we distinguish conceptually between affordances and
solicitations (Rietveld, 2008a; cf. Rietveld, 2008b; Withagen et al.,
2012). Second, we show that each affordance is embedded in a
landscape of affordances of a given form of life, which includes
socio-cultural practices in our human form of life. The embed-
dedness in this landscape is crucial for adequate anticipation of
the organism in its environment. It is only when we are attuned
to the specific context—including place-affordances—that we can
adequately be responsive to relevant solicitations that are in line
with our concerns. Third, at the level of the individual as a whole
we connect the reduction of gradients with the tendency toward
an optimal grip on a concrete situation.
Our formulation of affordance-responsiveness in terms of
self-organization does not yet address the problem of context-
sensitive selective openness to affordances, which, as we have
suggested in the introduction and earlier work (Kiverstein and
Rietveld, 2012), should be the central topic of Radical Embodied
Cognitive Neuroscience. The theories of self-organization and
synergetics (Haken, 1983) provide the framework in which to
investigate this important problem. In the upcoming sections
of this paper we explore how a complex system like the brain
can be selectively sensitive to only some environmental gradi-
ents/affordances.
ANTICIPATION AND SELECTIVE OPENNESS
In recent years, there has been growing interest in the application
of ideas from statistical physics, machine learning and complex
and dynamical systems theory to the brain (see for instance
8Iberall writes: “[Self-serving systems] can explore its surround to acquire the
necessary potentials at its boundary that serve as sources of free energy for its
own internal and externalized processes. In this case internal processes convert
internal energy into a useful form of work that can change momentum and
move the system to a favorable location (1977, p. 177).”
Freeman, 1987, 2000; Friston, 2006; Tognoli and Kelso, 2014).
What these approaches have in common is their appreciation of
the brain as an intrinsically active and unstable self-organizing
system. In part thanks to these authors, progress has been made
in how the self-organization of the brain can be functional with
respect to the larger brain-body-environment dynamics (see also
Freeman, 2000; Dreyfus, 2007). We think that this perspective
(neurodynamics embedded in brain-body-environment dynam-
ics) is the natural starting point to develop a Radical Embodied
Cognitive Neuroscience.
One promising proposal to couple brain, body and
environment is Karl Friston’s FEP (Friston, 2010)9. According to
the FEP, any self-organizing system that remains within physio-
logical bounds in its interactions with a changing environment
(and hence resist a natural tendency to disorder), can only
frequent a limited amount of physical states. This can be given
a mathematical interpretation in the sense that the probability
distribution of the organism’s states must have low entropy (i.e.,
there is a high probability that a system is in one of a relatively
small number of states). This long term imperative to constrain
the entropy of its states translates into a short term imperative
to suppress surprisal10 (see Box 3). Importantly, surprisal can
not be suppressed directly, since it depends on the expected
range of states over time. The information theoretic quantity of
free energy (not to be confused with the homologous concept
from thermodynamics)11 is an upper bound on surprisal such
that when an organism minimizes free energy, it is implicitly
minimizing surprisal (Friston, 2011).
Importantly, free energy can be evaluated, because it is a func-
tion of the organism’s sensory states and the organism’s internal
dynamics (called a generative model). Roughly, free energy is a
measure for the “dis-attunedness” of the internal dynamics and
the environmental dynamics. For example, it is low when the
sensory states are anticipated, and high when they are not. The
FEP says that minimizing free energy is a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for self-organizing adaptive systems to maintain a
robust brain-body-environment system and hence, remain within
physiological bounds.
In the active inference formulation (Friston, 2010, 2013b)
of the FEP, free energy can be minimized on short time scales
by making the environment conform to the internal dynamics
(“action”) or by making the internal dynamics conform to the
environmental dynamics (“perception”). There is an important
similarity between Tschacher and Haken’s framework of self-
organization and Friston’s FEP: what they call circular causality
and second circularity map onto what Friston calls “perception”
and “action,” respectively. It is through these two circularities that
organism and environment are coupled.
9What follows is a treatment of the theory of the FEP. For mathematical
details, see Friston (2006, 2012b).
10Because under ergodic assumptions, entropy is equal to the average of self-
information (surprisal), see Friston et al. (2009) for mathematical details.
11The latter has a clear physical definition in terms of the amount of energy
available in a system that is convertible to work. The former is a quantity from
information theory, which is an upper bound on surprisal. As such, informa-
tion theoretic free energy has nothing to do with energy in the ordinary sense
of the word.
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Box 3 | Information theory and the anticipating brain12.
SURPRISAL: A measure for the unexpectedness of an event expressed in terms of the negative log-probability of the event outcome.
FREE ENERGY: An information theoretic measure that is an upper bound on the surprisal of some data, given a generative model.
PREDICTION ERROR: The difference between anticipated and actual sensory input. Under simplifying assumptions, Free Energy equals
the sum of prediction errors.
The FEP in itself makes no claims about the mechanisms
underlying free energy minimization. It is supposed to be a nec-
essary requirement for any adaptive self-organizing system that
is able to resist the tendency to disorder. When it comes to
organisms with developed nervous systems, the FEP offers a rich
and sophisticated set of tools in order to gain a better under-
standing of how free energy can be minimized. Given some
simplifying assumptions (cf. Marreiros et al., 2009) the brain
dynamics can be modeled using variational Bayesian methods
and hierarchical predictive-coding. However, to avoid misunder-
standings, it is important to distinguish between the imperative
(i.e., minimizing free energy) and the mechanisms by which the
organism obeys that imperative. As Friston himself notes: “The
Bayesian brain and predictive-coding are [. . .] seen as a con-
sequence of [. . .] this fundamental imperative [of free energy
minimization.]” (Friston, 2013a, pp. 212–213). Free Energy min-
imization is thus the primary notion and we wish to fore-
ground that, rather than the Bayesian and the predictive-coding
framework 13.
The FEP implies a deep connection between the dynamics
of the brain-body-environment system and the neurodynam-
ics. What is crucial, for the organism, is that it anticipates
the kind of interactions with the environment that lead to an
adequate outcome (such as having food, or avoiding a pass-
ing car). The function of the generative model is therefore not
to provide the agent with a representation of the dynamical
structure of the environment per se, but rather to steer its inter-
actions with its environment in such a way that a robust brain-
body-environment system is maintained. The internal dynam-
ics, Friston’s generative model, can not be understood apart
from its functioning within the integrated brain-body-econiche
system.
To illustrate this point, note that Friston himself states, some-
what provocatively, that: “each [. . .] agent embodies an optimal
model14 of its econiche” (Friston, 2011). Furthermore, Friston
states that:
12Standard definitions taken from Friston (2010).
13Within the context of the FEP, much attention in the literature has been
given to how efficient information processing is possible (in the form of
predictive-coding and approximate Bayesian inference), however, much less
attention has been given to what structures in the environment the anticipat-
ing organism is responsive to. In this paper we are concerned with the latter
question.
14Although the FEP uses the word “model,” we think that it is used in a way
that makes it sufficiently compatible with radical embodiment. What radical
embodiment is against, is the idea that an agent has an internal model of the
world, which, through some inference process, provides the agent with a rep-
resentation of the world on which it consequently can decide what to do. This
is not what the FEP entails.
“[A]n agent does not have a model of its world—it is a model.
In other words, the form, structure, and states of our embodied
brains do not contain a model of the sensorium—they are that
model. [. . .] But what does this mean practically? It means that
every aspect of our brain can be predicted from our environment”
(Friston, 2013a, p. 213).
For Friston, the niche implies the structure of the organism.
Now, for our argument, we do not need to subscribe to this last
claim in the fullest sense, but it shows the radical potential of
the FEP.
In general we think the FEP is a step forward in understanding
the relation between environmental dynamics and neurodynam-
ics. It is an attractive framework because we think it is able to
formalize the tendency toward an optimal grip in terms of the
dynamical coupling between brain dynamics and the dynamics of
the whole brain-body-environment system, or more specific: of
the whole system “brain-body-landscape of affordances.” Within
the framework of the FEP the tendency toward an optimal grip
could be seen as a consequence of the continuous minimization
of free energy through perception and action at the level of the
organism as a whole: the attunement of the internal dynamics and
external dynamics.
However, we worry that along with the welcome mathematical
sophistication comes a vocabulary that is mathematically conve-
nient, but philosophically problematic (Anderson and Chemero,
2013). For instance, within philosophy and cognitive science the
notion of “inference” is traditionally understood in terms of
arriving at a propositional statement based on some premises
or observations. Within the Free Energy framework, the notion
of “inference” is much more minimal and does not involve any
propositions: any dynamical systemA coupled with another B can
be said to “infer” the “hidden cause” of its “input” (the dynam-
ics of B) when it reliably covaries with the dynamics of B and
it is robust to the noise inherent in the coupling. [For a presen-
tation of this minimal notion of inference, see Friston (2012b,
2013c)]. This is important, because it suggests that the apparent
tension between radical embodiment and the FEP is at least to
some extent terminological15.
To summarize, the FEP dictates that in order to maintain
a robust brain-body-environment system, an organism can and
15The radical response would be to question the added explanatory value of
the notion of inference over and above the dynamical explanation (Chemero,
2009). We lack the space here to retranslate the FEP in non-propositional,
dynamical terms, but we think that this is possible. For the moment, it is
important to emphasize that notions such as “inference,” “belief,” and “expec-
tation” all have a different meaning within computational neuroscience and
philosophy.
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needs to continuously minimize the prediction error or discrep-
ancy (formalized in terms of free energy) between its internal
dynamics and the dynamics of the larger system. The organ-
ism does not need to have a model of its niche, but rather the
claim is that the structure of the niche is reflected in the struc-
ture of the skilled embodied organism. We will argue that the
internal dynamics should be understood in terms of affordance-
related action-readiness patterns. The notion of an econiche is not
developed any further in Friston’s work up to now, but we will
come back to the relation between an organism’s niche (made up
of a landscape of affordances) and the internal dynamics in the
Section on Situating the Anticipating Brain.
So far we have focused on integrating our theoretical frame-
work of skilled intentionality with the theoretical framework of
the FEP. The integration of these two frameworks now places us
in a position to look at the neurodynamics of selective affordance-
responsiveness under the FEP. It is here that the theory of self-
organization, introduced in the previous section of this paper
becomes important again.
THE NEURODYNAMICS OF SELECTIVE OPENNESS
In this section we will present a neurodynamical approach that is
able to account for selective-responsiveness to affordances within
the adjusted framework of the FEP. Within the Free Energy
framework, selective responsiveness is brought about by pattern
generators that make both sensory (exteroceptive) and motor
(proprioceptive) predictions (Friston, 2012a)16. Pattern genera-
tors are well known through the work of Randall Beer on robot
locomotion (Beer and Chiel, 1993). They are systems that are
capable of producing rhythmic or sequential patterns and can be
modulated by sensory feedback. Beer uses coupled pattern gener-
ators with sensory feedback to build distributed control circuits
for robot locomotion. The dynamics of a pattern generator is
modulated and constrained by both its sensory feedback and the
dynamics of the other pattern generators.
Kiebel et al. (2009) show that by coupling pattern genera-
tors evolving at different timescales, one can create a dynamical
system (a generative model in the sense introduced in the last
section) that is capable of swiftly interacting with a complex
dynamical environment. The pattern generator evolving at longer
timescales serves as a control parameter that shapes the attractor
at which the lower-level dynamics unfold. The specific kinds of
pattern generators they use are so called stable heteroclinic chan-
nels (Rabinovich et al., 2008). These are defined as a sequence
of metastable (saddle) points with transients in between17. When
these stable heteroclinic channels are coupled in a temporal hier-
archy, the ensuing dynamics never reaches a fixed stable point,
16In fact, Friston uses the word “affordance” to designate the activation pat-
terns that guide affordance responsiveness. This is not in line with how the
term is traditionally used in ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979) and phi-
losophy (Chemero, 2003) and is bound to lead to confusion. We will use
“action-readiness pattern” to designate what Friston calls “affordance.”
17An intuitive example of a stable heteroclinic channel would be a pub-crawl.
One visits a sequence of bars (the metastable saddle points), while walking
from one to another in between (the transients). The sequence might be fixed,
but the timing for when to move to a new bar is generally left to the specific
circumstances.
but continuously follows a trajectory through state space (Kiebel
et al., 2009). This trajectory is continuously modulated through
sensory feedback (prediction errors). Some prediction errors can
be accommodated for on the lower level, leaving the slower-
evolving patterns intact (for instance when synchronizing to an
external rhythm), while other prediction errors, can induce or
destroy the pattern generators at a longer timescales as well (such
as when the beat of the music changes dramatically).
This is important for understanding how the selective open-
ness helps to make, in the particular situation, the distinc-
tion between the relevant affordance(s) and other affordances;
between the one(s) to be responded to here and now and the
ones that leave the organism cold. The generation of an adequate
action-readiness rests upon precise sensory feedback that feeds
into a dynamical system (generative model) that is shaped by
the organism’s previous interactions with the environment. The
system will settle on a pattern that explains away most of the
prediction error (i.e., the system tends toward a particular attrac-
tor). On slower time-scales this amounts to “action selection”,
while on the faster timescales the action is specified: prediction
errors influence the attractors that make more specific sensori-
motor predictions (“action specification”). Both action selection
and action specification depend on sensitivity to small distur-
bances that is, deviations from anticipations generated by pattern
generators (Cisek, 2007; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010).
The fact that stable heteroclinic channels implement
metastable attractor dynamics is crucial for understanding the
flexibility of selective openness to affordances. Kelso (2012)
describes metastability as the outcome of two competing ten-
dencies: the tendency of the components to couple together
and the tendency to express their independent behavior. In this
metastable regime, the system is poised at the edge of instability,
a kind of dynamic stability that allows the system to maintain
“a balance in the readiness of the system to transit between
multiple attractors” (Davids et al., 2012., p. 119). While being
skillfully engaged with a specific task, it is important that we can
be affected by affordances on the horizon of our field and rapidly
switch to another kind of adequate activity when something in
the environment changes. Metastable dynamics are important for
understanding the brain, because metastability is a prerequisite
for a system to be able to effortlessly switch between different
patterns. We will see that metastability plays an important role
as well in the brain-body-environment dynamics of skilled
agents, in the Section: Toward a Radical Embodied Cognitive
Neuroscience.
In Friston’s picture, the elicitation of an action-readiness-
pattern triggers a cascade of spatiotemporal dynamics in the brain
modulated by sensory input that aids anticipation on the inter-
actions with the environment. In ballroom dancing for instance,
the first measures of music will afford either dancing tango or
waltz. The elicitation of the tango-dancing-pattern will trigger
an attractor-manifold that governs the sensorimotor coordina-
tion between me, my dance partner and the music: this action-
readiness pattern will make certain action possibilities solicit
more to me than others. On a more fine-grained level, small
cues by the dance partner and subtle variations in the rhythm in
the music further specify my action-readiness. Only if I am well
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 599 | 8
Bruineberg and Rietveld Self-organization and optimal grip
attuned to the context (the situation) and thus metastably poised
for several relevant activities I could do next, can small cues in the
environment lead to very different positions in state space and
hence to flexible responsiveness to (very) different solicitations.
That is, only when I am able to rapidly accommodate the small
deviations from my anticipations (in Friston’s terms: the ability
to explain away prediction errors through perception and action)
can I engage skillfully with a complex environment.
Within our adjusted version of the FEP, a solicitation is a gra-
dient/prediction error that, through action, can be resolved by a
change in the brain-body-environment system. These gradients
are the result of the individual’s selective openness to the available
affordances which is the result of dynamical patterns evolv-
ing at multiple time-scales. The dynamics unfolding over long
timescales act as control parameters or constraints for dynamics
unfolding over shorter timescales. Crucially, when the dynamical
system (generative model) and the environmental dynamics are
well attuned to each other, the solicitations/gradients/prediction
errors that stand out as to-be-responded-to are the ones that lead
toward an optimal grip on the environment.
An open question that remains is the following: what does it
mean to say, under the FEP, that the organism and the environ-
ment are well attuned to each other? In other words, what aspects
of the environment must the generative model be reflecting for
the organism to interact adequately with its environment?We will
address these questions in the next section.
SITUATING THE ANTICIPATING BRAIN
Radical Embodiment emphasizes the non-decomposability of
the brain-body-environment system, which implies that the
neural dynamics can only be studied while taking into account
the larger brain-body-environment dynamics (Chemero, 2009).
When focusing on one element of these dynamics, such as
the brain, one can model the rest of the dynamics as control
parameters (Friston, 2000). This allows for several perspectives
on essentially the same dynamics: the state variables of the
brain-body-environment system can be control parameters for
the brain. From this perspective, it is possible to focus on the
dynamics of the brain18 : in this case, the body and the envi-
ronment are described as control parameters (prediction errors)
that are changing themselves. Given that the brain is situated
within a robust brain-body-environment system, one can derive
constraints on how the brain is coupled to the wider system.
Following this analysis of the dynamical coupling, one ends up
with the perspective of the FEP.
If aspects of our brain can be predicted from our environ-
ment, we need to understand which aspects of the environment
are being reflected in brain dynamics. The fundamental idea of
the FEP is that by being equipped with a generative model that
reflects the hierarchical and temporal organization of the chang-
ing environment, organisms are able to remain attuned with the
dynamics of the environment. This invites the question how the
18Note that this pertains to the domain of coupled dynamical systems. Given
the centrality of the brain-body-environment system as a whole, we do not
think the possibility of constructing such a perspective from the brain justifies
epistemic internalism.
landscape of affordances, introduced in the first section of this
paper, and the generative model/the organism are related to each
other.
At several places Friston states that the agent is inferring
the causal structure of the environment (e.g., Friston, 2011).
However, it is important to qualify this in several respects. First,
above, we have interpreted Friston’s notion of inference in a non-
propositional way fully within the domain of dynamical systems.
Second, the agent is not modeling the causal structure of the envi-
ronment per se, but rather those aspects of the environment that
are important within its specific niche. We think that what is
“inferred” in active inference, as we have noted above, are not
objects or properties of objects, but rather anticipatory patterns
that specify a solicitation. A pattern on which the system settles
does not represent, say, a carrot, the smell of a carrot, or what
to do with a carrot, but rather, the attractor state is directly cou-
pled to the affordance of the carrot here and now (Freeman, 2000;
Dreyfus, 2007): at no point in skillful action is the organism infer-
ring the current causal state of the environment, and on top of
that figuring out what change in the causal structure will lead to a
more favorable outcome. Rather, the gradients/prediction errors
themselves trigger the right anticipatory pattern that makes the
right affordance stand out and that minimizes free energy or, in
more phenomenological terms, leads to an optimal grip on the
organism’s environment.
Inspired by Gibson (1979) we have, as mentioned in the intro-
duction, suggested that we can understand the ecological niche
as a landscape of affordances (Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2012).
Armed with our understanding of the richness of the landscape
of affordances available in our form of life (as developed in the
first part of the paper), we argue that what the embodied organ-
ism is “modeling” or reflecting in a particular situation, is not
so much the causal structure of the environment per se, but
rather the dynamic nested structure of the field of affordances.
We do not think this is in contradiction with the FEP but rather
a natural consequence of combining active inference (action and
perception jointly reducing gradients/prediction errors) and the
need for the organism to be governing its interactions with the
environment.
This contextualization of the anticipating brain is important
for two reasons. First, it makes clear that the FEP really calls for an
integrative approach for understanding the mutual attunement
of the brain and the other components of the whole brain-
body-environment system. The deep correspondence between the
dynamics in the environment and the neurodynamics implies
that we can learn something about the brain by investigating the
structure of the econiche, i.e., of the landscape of affordances.
Second, it provides a new understanding of the tendency
toward an optimal grip, which is a central notion in phenomenol-
ogy, as the concernful skilled agent’s tendency to reduce his or her
dis-attunement to the environmental dynamics. In particular, it
provides an understanding of how the relevance of affordances is
selectively brought: the relevance of an affordance (an attribute
of the brain-body-environment system) is in part brought about
by aspects of the environment triggering patterns that shape the
skillful agent’s action-readiness for interacting with its environ-
ment. We think that the field of affordances both captures an
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important aspect of the phenomenology of skilled intentionality,
and can inform theoretical neuroscientists about what it is the
self-organizing brain is responsive to (i.e., what external control
parameters influence the self-organization of the brain). Skilled
intentionality should be of particular interest to those who work
on the implications of the free-energy principle, because it is the
kind of intentionality manifested when we act as “surprisallessly”
as possible: when we are in familiar environments and can act
relatively unreflectively and effortlessly.
TOWARD A RADICAL EMBODIED COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE
In the previous sections, we have presented an integrative
framework for studying skilled intentionality. In this section
we will illustrate the plausibility of our framework by present-
ing work on metastability in the system “brain-body-landscape
of affordances” dynamics of skilled sportsmen, and empirical
research on the impact of DBS on affordance responsiveness of
OCD patients.
METASTABILITY AND OPTIMAL GRIP
Above we have seen that metastable dynamics are an important
characteristic of neurodynamics, because it allows for context-
sensitive selective openness and flexible switching between activi-
ties. An interesting property of metastable dynamics in the brain,
like the stable heteroclinic channels described in Section The
Neurodynamics of Selective Openness for example, is the pos-
sibility to be both robust to perturbations and flexible19. The
dynamics of the coupled patterns generators can be described
as visiting a succession of unstable fixed points in an abstract
state space (Tsuda, 2001; Rabinovich et al., 2008). The itinerant
dynamics can be observed at different time-scales or at different
levels of the hierarchy. One can see how such a system can be both
robust and flexible: on the one hand do slower-evolving dynam-
ics constrain the faster-evolving dynamics, on the other hand,
because of the metastable character of the slower dynamics, some
perturbations (e.g., as a result of gradients/prediction errors) can
easily and swiftly change the slower dynamics and make it shift to
a new pattern that better fits with the multiplicity of affordances
currently encountered.
Importantly, metastable dynamics in the brain-body-
environment system as a whole provide an important paradigm
for understanding movement pattern variability in ecological
situations. For example, Hristovski et al. (2006, 2009) investi-
gated how boxers’ striking patterns differed when manipulating
the distance to a boxing bag. At great distances, they observed a
“jab” movement, while at short distances, they observed “hooks”
and “uppercuts.” At a critical distance of 0.6 (the distance to the
punch bag scaled by the arm length), they found an optimal
metastable performance region where a varied and creative range
of movement patterns occurred: a region in which the boxers
“could flexibly switch between any of the boxing action modes”
(Chow et al., 2011, p. 197). So, at different scaled-body distances,
19This contrasts with phase locked dynamics. Phase locked dynamics are
generally robust to small perturbations as well, but lack the flexibility of
metastable dynamics.
the boxing bag solicited different punches, but at the optimal
metastable distance, the boxing bag solicited a wide variety of
punches. Here something occurs that might be called aHypergrip
on the field of affordances (Rietveld, 2013). For an expert boxer the
zone of optimal metastable distance will solicit moving toward,
because this zone offers a wide range of action opportunities
and the possibility to flexibly switch between them in line
with what the dynamically changing environment demands
or solicits.
Anticipation is an important aspect of the phenomenon of
Hypergrip on the field of affordances. This is best illustrated by
means of an example from a different field of expertise. In ice-
climbing, the metastable regime is one where the expert climber
can use different movement patterns to obtain the same result
(Seifert et al., 2014). Moreover, a skilled climber is anticipating
the affordances ahead; she does not just get a grip on the next
hold in climbing, say, but also anticipates that she needs to be able
to move on after that. So, the question of relevance sensitivity is
not just about grasping the next hold, but rather about which of
the available holds afford obtaining a grip on the whole climbing
route ahead. One can see again that in such a metastable state,
one is flexibly able to switch between different movement regimes
and better fit to adapt to the specific details of the environmental
aspects.
These studies suggests that, at least in some domains of skilled
action, we can formalize the tendency toward an optimal grip in
terms of the occurrence of metastable movement patterns. More
precisely, we can understand the tendency toward an optimal
grip as the tendency toward an optimal metastable attunement
to the dynamics of the environment. This optimal readiness
to switch between behavioral patterns is both functional with
respect to the demands of the environment and the needs of
the organism.
Further empirical research on optimal metastable
performance regions in ecological psychology will thus be
able to illuminate the phenomenon of the tendency toward an
optimal grip and the selective openness to relevant affordances.
It will be particularly interesting to see what agents will do in
situations in which there is not a specific task given, or when they
are allowed to switch spontaneously between different ways to
solve a task, just like in everyday life.
Moreover, the phenomena of flexible switching and Hypergrip
on the field of affordances on the horizon touch upon one of the
most important open questions in cognitive science, the frame
problem (Wheeler, 2008; Rietveld, 2012b). Skilled intentionality
treats context as just more affordances—a landscape of affor-
dances available in an ecological niche—and avoids the frame
problem by starting from the phenomenon of maintaining grip
on multiple affordances simultaneously.
How can the neurodynamics involved in selective openness
support an optimal grip on the whole field of affordances includ-
ing possibilities for action on the horizon? In order to answer this
question, we need to understand how the self-organized metasta-
bility of the brain-body-environment system interacts with the
self-organized metastability of the brain. To advance, it is impor-
tant to develop neuroscientific research methods that are able to
complement the work done on boxing and climbing in an actual
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ecological setting. What is the difference in neurodynamics in the
optimal metastable region as compared to the other regions of
performance? In the next section, we present recent research by
our group on the impact of DBS on affordance responsiveness
as an example of such a complementary approach that also takes
phenomenology seriously.
MOOD DISORDERS AND RELEVANCE-SENSITIVITY
Our understanding of relevance sensitivity as the self-organized
coordination of action-readiness patterns is closely related to
Frijda’s theory of emotions (Frijda, 1986, 2007). According to his
theory, the key aspect of an emotion is a state of action-readiness
for changing an aspect of the self-object relationship.
Moods are action-readiness patterns that persist for longer
periods of time and typically have a relatively global character:
a mood is reflected in the structure of field of affordances as
a whole (See Figure 2A). Similarly, we can understand mood
disorders as disorders that distort the field of affordances: in
the case of depression, for example, the field of affordances is
rather flat, nothing stands out as attractive or soliciting any-
more (see Figure 2B). A recent qualitative study investigates the
effects of DBS on the phenomenology of patients suffering from
treatment resistant OCD (de Haan et al., 2013). OCD can be
characterized by the presence of anxiety-provoking thoughts, typ-
ically followed by ritualistic behaviors (compulsions) to relieve
the anxiety. In extreme cases of OCD, the patient’s field of
affordances is narrowed down to just the immediate solicitation
of what has to be done here and now without the possibil-
ity of flexibly switching to a new readiness for other behaviors
(See Figure 2C).
DBS treatment consists of permanently implanted electrodes
that deliver electrical pulses to a target brain region. DBS of
the nucleus accumbens shows promising results as treatment for
OCD patients (Denys et al., 2010). It is hypothesized that, rather
than merely having inhibitory or excitatory effects on the tar-
get area, DBS restores intrinsic brain network dynamics (Figee
et al., 2013). In particular, the authors show that DBS treatment
normalizes the activity of the nucleus accumbens and restores
the intrinsic frontostriatal network dynamics. These frontostriatal
circuits are known to be important for switching between differ-
ent actions (Ridderinkhof et al., 2011). Furthermore, it was found
that the frontostriatal connectivity changes strongly correlated
with OCD symptom improvement (Figee et al., 2013).
From phenomenological interviews with these OCD-patients,
it becomes clear that, by treatment with DBS combined with cog-
nitive behavioral therapy, these patients report a general change
in engagement with the world pertaining to perception, reflec-
tion, mood, interests and social interaction (Rietveld et al., 2013).
These impressive phenomenological changes can be understood
as changes in the responsiveness to the field of affordances along
three dimensions: the “width” (the scope of affordances engaged
with), the “depth” (the temporal horizon), and the “height” (the
relevance) of the field of affordances (see Figure 2) (deHaan et al.,
2013).
Above we have argued that affordance-responsiveness corre-
sponds to heavily interacting neurodynamics at different tem-
poral scales. DBS can directly perturb these neurodynamics and
FIGURE 2 | Sketch of different fields of relevant affordances. (A) A
normally structured, differentiated field of affordances. (B) The field of
affordances of a depressed person. (C) The field of affordances of an
OCD-patient. Creative Commons license applies (de Haan et al., 2013).
hence directly influence the general capability of affordance-
responsiveness (de Haan et al., 2013). The observed change in
affordance-responsiveness opens up the possibility to develop
neurodynamical models of OCD and psychiatric disorders more
generally, based on Friston’s ideas on the anticipating brain.
Friston’s model of addiction (2012c) highlights the importance
of metastable, itinerant dynamics for modeling adaptive and
pathological behavior. In personal communication (June 15th,
2012) Friston has suggested that OCD could also be mod-
eled along the same lines. We are currently working on a
research project that uses our framework and an updated ver-
sion of Friston’s (2012c) model for addiction, to generate testable
hypotheses about the neural mechanisms that could underlie
the breakdown of normal affordance-responsiveness in OCD-
patients and its recovery through DBS treatment.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the phenomenon of skilled
intentionality from the perspective of the self-organization
of both the brain-body-environment system and the brain.
Previously, we have characterized skilled intentionality as the
organism’s tendency toward an optimal grip on a field of relevant
affordances. In this paper we have investigated the mechanisms
that underlie the self-organized selective openness to available
affordance and the organism’s tendency toward an optimal grip.
We have integrated different perspectives on this phenomenon:
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the philosophy of skilled of intentionality, Kelso’s and Tschacher
and Haken’s ideas on self-organization, Friston’s theory of the
anticipating brain, and work on metastable dynamics. What these
four perspectives on the affordance-responsive active individual
have in common is the idea that a an organism self-organizes
by reducing a disequilibrium in the brain-body-environment sys-
tem. On the different levels of analysis, this disequilibrium can
be called a solicitation, a gradient or a prediction error, or a dis-
attunedness of internal dynamics and environmental dynamics.
Our integrated framework moves beyond the traditional
Gibsonian conception of affordances, because it highlights that
the animal cares about certain things and needs to be selec-
tively open to the relevant affordances in a particular situation.
Explaining this selective openness to affordances in dynamical
terms should be the main focus for Radical Embodied Cognitive
Neuroscience. Friston’s neurodynamical models provide an inter-
esting perspective on the possible neural mechanisms that under-
lie the selective openness to relevant affordances. Furthermore,
the tendency toward an optimal grip could, within the per-
spective provided by the FEP, be seen as a consequence of the
continuous attunement of the internal dynamics and external
dynamics through affordance-responsiveness. We have suggested
that the situated anticipation of an affordance generates an
action-readiness pattern that makes the affordance stand out
as relevant.
Although the FEP alludes to the attunement of the dynamics
in the environment and the organism’s own dynamics, the body
of work in ecological psychology on the rich metastable dynamics
in the brain-body-environment system that often is overlooked by
the people working on neurodynamics. We have suggested that by
bringing together these two approaches with our phenomenol-
ogy of skilled action, it is possible to develop an integrative
research project for understanding affordance responsiveness in
both healthy and pathological cases.
From the picture presented in this paper it becomes clear
that the common ground for researchers in radical embodied
cognitive science, ecological psychologists and dynamical compu-
tational neuroscientists is the view that the brain is an intrinsi-
cally instable dynamical system embedded in the broader system
“brain-body-landscape of affordances.” The central way in which
an organism relates to its environment is by the organism as a
whole tending toward an optimal grip on the field of affordances.
It is this phenomenon that should be a central topic in Radical
Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience.
In his influential article on action-oriented predictive pro-
cessing, Clark (2013) is hesitant to embrace the more radical
implications of the FEP. In Friston’s full Free Energy story, one
does not need to appeal to desires, goals and rewards in order to
explain behavior, but one can replace them with prediction and
anticipation; utility functions are replaced by the minimization
of prediction error. Clark dubs this resulting picture the “desert
landscape” scenario.
However, we think this scenario is rather appealing because
unlike almost all work in cognitive neuroscience it does not
presuppose the presence of a “goal” or “desire” of which it is
completely unclear how it was selected out of the many possible
“goals” or “desires.” Furthermore, the title “desert landscape” is
a misleading depiction of the human ecological niche or land-
scape of affordances, which is in fact very rich independently of
any particular individual. Moreover, we have seen that the skilled
individual does not have an explicit goal in mind, but rather is
solicited or invited by the field of affordances. We think that what
is at the root of skilled activity is not a set of desires or goals,
but rather the ongoing modulation of coupled self-organizing
dynamical systems that results in the adequate interaction of an
organism with its environment.
The best way to characterize these dynamics is in terms of
anticipation and attunement. This radical version of the FEP
should appeal to enactivists and embodied cognitive scientists,
for it does not posit an explanatory role for propositional inter-
nal states at the basis of our cognitive system and takes self-
organization seriously. Clark’s main objection against the desert
landscape scenario is that, even if it were true, it will not pro-
vide the best way of making sense of the rich organization of
our cognitive organization. We agree with Clark here. As we have
shown in this paper, an appeal to anticipation and attunement on
the sub-personal level in no sense precludes us from highlight-
ing the rich phenomenology of skilled action and the valuable
affordances available in the ecological niche. The resulting picture
then is not, as it is according to Clark, a barren desert land-
scape, but rather one of engagement with a flourishing field of
affordances.
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